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Mutual Learning with Trade-Offs
Kirsten Wever
Rutgers University
Comparative social scientists have never quite explained how eco-
nomic and political practitioners and decision makers in different
countries learn from each other.  The question has gained policy rele-
vance over the past two decades with the transformation of the assem-
bly line and mass production, the rise of new service industries, and the
globalization of most domestic economies.  With Japan still recovering
from its severest social and economic shock in the postwar period, it
makes intuitive sense to shift our focus to the United States and Ger-
many for cues.  Both appear to be in better political economic shape
than Japan in a variety of ways noted in this volume.  Both countries
have apparently intransigent and hardly insignificant shortcomings.
Both because of and in spite of these problems, we believe than com-
parisons between the German and American models are especially illu-
minating.
The chapters in this book compare sectoral and firm-level adjust-
ment processes, modes of innovation, and processes of change, focus-
ing on examples of and possibilities for cross-border and cross-sectoral
learning in Germany and the United States.  In one way or another,
each chapter also explores the proposition that the benefits of German
coordinating institutions and of the United States’ more decentralized
political economy each entail trade-offs that may be necessary and are
certainly politically unpleasant.
Cross-border and cross-sectoral learning are as difficult to under-
stand as to undertake.  Piecemeal learning is hampered by the intercon-
nectedness of political economic systems, with changes on one
dimension necessarily affecting, and affected by, others.  At the same
time, the wholesale transfer of institutional systems is unlikely in the
absence of major political displacement caused by war and occupation.
Yet a substantial and growing body of empirical evidence has led to a
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loose scholarly consensus that considerable transfer of some sort is
occurring across national borders generally, and especially between
Germany and the United States.  Certainly it is not the case that prac-
tices identified in one setting, such as the German apprenticeship train-
ing system or different types of “lean production,” are being quickly,
easily, or completely lifted across national borders and copied.
Instead, corporate actors, powerful individuals, policymakers, or poli-
cymaking bodies are engaged in iterative, experimental, and partial
efforts at transferring and adapting certain concepts and practices.
Institutional/organizational transfer takes a back seat to various
dynamic, even volatile, processes of learning, compromise, adjust-
ment, and innovation, usually among actors “on the ground” rather
than in the context of national competitiveness policies.  Therefore,
what we can learn from previous work in this area is limited.
Indeed, much past research and theorizing in both countries has
focused on how institutions can be transferred at the macro (national)
level (Jacoby 1997).  In the United States, such debates—for instance,
about importing apprenticeship training institutions or works coun-
cils—have never gained a great deal of momentum, not least because
of the obvious and numerous obstacles posed by the functioning of and
relationship among U.S. banks, companies, workers, unions, and the
environment in which they operate.  In Germany, debates about the
decentralization of industrial and employment relations and the dereg-
ulation of markets (including the labor markets) have continued to
bump up against the strategic resistance of unions as well as large seg-
ments of the employer community, and more recently against the small
but growing influence of the European Union’s social policy agenda.
Meanwhile, however, individual actors are busy establishing new oper-
ations, managing joint ventures and collective interests, developing
labor–management innovations, and learning from each other’s suc-
cesses and failures.
A great deal has been written about the benefits to labor and busi-
ness of Germany’s coordinated institutionalized system of employment
relations (see, e.g., Wever 1995; Turner 1991).  Yet one important
unanswered question for Germans is how to minimize the constraining
aspects of this system while maximizing the supportive aspects of
national and sectoral institutional frameworks.  For instance, can indus-
try-wide coordination of employment relations, which takes some of
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the costs of labor out of competition among employers, be combined
with vigorous local innovations?
Germany’s framework institutions have been famous for address-
ing market failures which individual local actors may not want or be
able to address, but which ultimately detract from the common good.
The training system is the most obvious case in point.  Can local U.S.
actors make the practical distinction between the problematic (time-
consuming) and the beneficial (cost-sharing) aspects of Germany’s
framework institutions?  Can the latter be supported in an environment
that naturally bypasses or compensates for the former?
It is widely agreed that by international standards the Americans
are especially good at rapidly developing and executing impressive
innovations—from labor–management relations to the reorganization
of production/service delivery or the training of managers—because of
the diverse and decentralized nature of the country’s political economy.
Not surprisingly, Germans are examining which aspects of the decen-
tralized U.S. system spur innovation.  What is undoubtedly more com-
plicated is disentangling these from the forces that can inhibit
innovation, or its diffusion across settings, or the diffusion of its social
and economic benefits.  How much and what kind of institutional
framework do we need to avoid these problems, and what will it cost
whom?  Recent pressures in Germany to rein in public spending and
lower unemployment, deriving in part from the consolidation of the
European Union’s economic agenda, bring new urgency to this issue.
Finally, how much room is there for cross-sectoral learning, both
among and within countries?  Could innovations in interfirm coopera-
tion in the German electronics sector and in more flexible employment
relations (especially in the Neue Länder1) help map out how local
actors might accommodate changes in what is negotiated, by whom,
and how?  Could companies in the United States develop loose frame-
work institutions for joint training programs that could avoid “poach-
ing,”2 lessen pressures for head-to-head competition, and ultimately
produce more highly skilled workforces?  Could such framework insti-
tutions be structured so as to adapt themselves to changing external
pressures, as suggested by Thelen (1991)?
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INSTITUTIONS, IDEAS, AND 
THE IMPETUS FOR LEARNING
Mutual learning takes place at the intersection of institutions, ideas
or cultures, and actors’ often competing strategies.  Lessons reside in
the great strengths and weaknesses of both countries in various politi-
cal economic arenas.  The authors of this volume share the view that
significant mutual learning between the two countries will require care-
ful consideration of the contexts that structure how actors think about
and carry out the strategies they perceive to be available; of how actors
can, at least in principle, change those institutions; and of what cross-
national and subnational/cross-sectoral (or cross-case) comparisons
imply about the malleability of institutions and actor strategies.  Exam-
ining these areas has become increasingly important in recent years,
because change, adjustment, and innovation—whether indigenous or
transferred from abroad—have all taken on increasingly pressing rele-
vance to political economies and therefore to policymakers and practi-
tioners throughout the advanced capitalist countries.
Why should social actors in the United States and Germany be
especially interested in learning from each other?  Germany and the
United States remain the two most powerful western economies and
have over several decades been ranked the world’s number one and two
exporters.  Germany’s core economy remains sound, notwithstanding
still-high unemployment in the east.  Indeed, many of Germany’s prob-
lems can be traced directly to the still-astronomical costs of unification.
The United States economy remains fundamentally robust, despite the
slowdown that began near the end of the year 2000, and its low unem-
ployment levels are the envy of many advanced capitalist countries.
But the 1980s and 1990s have exposed cracks in the foundations of
Germany’s social market economy and of the more free market United
States approach.  Germany is experiencing far greater difficulties in
integrating the eastern and western economies and societies than was
anticipated at the time of unification in 1990.  Official unemployment
in eastern Germany remains well over the EU average (which is hover-
ing between 8 and 12 percent), and social tensions have spawned polit-
ically disruptive and even frightening debates about underlying causes.
Many employers insist the problems are chiefly related to high labor
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costs and centralized bargaining.  Yet studies have found significant
organizational and managerial rigidities, which surely play into the
slow pace of change that contributes to Germany’s competitiveness
problems, especially in the service and high-technology sectors (Wal-
genbach 1993; Lane 1989).  Similarly, it has become common to criti-
cize the German economy for its lack of easily available venture capital
and for various other innovation-inhibiting features of its financial sys-
tem.
In the United States, macrolevel indicators of overall economic
competitiveness have long been paralleled by extreme disparities in
earnings and wealth.  These disparities are starkly visible in certain
regions, sectors, and subsectors, which remain extraordinarily underde-
veloped by the standards of the advanced capitalist world.  Inequality is
perpetuated by and reflected in the fragmented nature of employment
relations: well-paying union and nonunion jobs in strong manufactur-
ing and service industries exist alongside extremely insecure, low-pay-
ing, mostly nonunion jobs in smaller, weaker companies and
industries.  Such inequalities would not arise in Germany because of
the presence of strong, central coordinating institutions in the areas of
employment relations and related aspects of the political economy.
Closely linked to this patchwork quilt of work and employment in the
United States is the extremely uneven quality of workers’ and manag-
ers’ skills, which has alarming implications for even medium-term
national competitiveness.
Our focused comparisons of specific political economic domains
in these two countries allows us to avoid what Hyman (1994, p. 1)
calls “the crude juxtaposition of superficial and ill-digested data . . . or
else a gauche imposition on national experience of preset taxonomies.”
These chapters report on original research by scholars who share a
loose, institutional analytical approach and an interest in understand-
ing work and employment relationships in their political economic
contexts.  We focus on four contemporary arenas of political economic
change: telecommunications deregulation and privatization, manage-
ment development systems, supplier relations, and employment rela-
tions.
Much comparison—especially of the United States and Ger-
many—has had an implicit bias toward one or another model.  In the
1970s, it was fashionable among social scientists to argue that social
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democratic institutions are good per se and that we should all learn
from countries like Germany.  In fact, of course, institutions will
always constrain some actors while supporting others, and precisely
which actors are constrained or supported changes over time.  For
example, in the 1930s and early 1940s, the United States employer
community saw itself as benefiting from the Wagner Act, which gov-
erned union–management relations in most sectors.  This act appeared
to guarantee labor peace and far-ranging managerial prerogatives.
Today, most employers and even some unionists are actively hostile to
that legal framework.  In 1952, German unions and employers were
extremely anxious about the effects of the Works Constitution Act
which regulated codetermination at the workplace by instituting the
most powerful works councils in Europe.  Currently, many German
employers are positively inclined toward the councils and most unions
see them as powerful allies at the point of production.  In short, institu-
tions per se are not good or bad, but the functions they perform for
society and the economy at a given point in time certainly can be (see,
for example, Dore 1973; Maurice, Sellier, and Sylvestre 1986; see also
Berger and Piore 1980).
The idea of “best institutions” has its analog in that of “best prac-
tice,” according to which firm-level flexibility is good in and of itself,
and which implies that everyone should learn from the United States.
Throughout the 1980s, the business press promoted certain corporate
practices as more or less context-independent solutions to common
international pressures (see, for instance, Hamel and Prahalad 1994;
Kotter and Heskett 1992; Womack, Jones, and Roos 1991).  Since the
collapse of the Soviet system, business consultants and scholars have
broadened their prescriptions to encompass “best” economic institu-
tions as well (Naisbitt 1997; Porter 1998).  In greater or lesser measure,
these works are premised on the notion that there are single best ways
for corporations to organize work, production, and service delivery
and, at least by implication, for societies to structure national econo-
mies.
In fact, however, learning is not about strategic choices of best
practices.  Even at the company level, learning is very conditional: Jap-
anese-style lean production looks very different in Germany than it
does in the United States.  Institutions can constrain and/or support
strategies and practices, but the reverse is true as well—strategies and
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practices can also affect institutions.  It remains as important to ask
who has the power to exercise strategic choices as it does to determine
how these choices can be exercised and how people think about them.  
Finally, we need to add to our explanatory framework not just insti-
tutions, organizations, and the strategies and practices that make sense
within the contexts they establish, but also the ways in which
entrenched ideologies (often translated into strategies) may not reflect
any natural interests of either employers or the collective representa-
tives of labor.  Differing ideas—for example, about best practice or
appropriate ways of negotiating conflicting interests—can both ener-
gize learning by offering breadth and impede it when certain poten-
tially constructive ideas are ruled out.  This added dimension is so
extraordinarily difficult to define that we do not attempt to do so.  How-
ever, it can be discerned throughout the dynamics we analyze here.
While it is the least developed dimension of our comparative studies,
we certainly do not regard it as the least important.
THE CHAPTERS
Since the 1990s, social scientists have often placed Germany and
the United States at more or less opposite ends of a conceptual contin-
uum, with the institutionally coordinated German Social Market Econ-
omy and its employment relations system at one end and the U.S.
political economy, with its decentralized system of labor–management
relations, at the other.  We try to play on the strengths of this heuristic
without getting caught up in it, staying open to ways in which it may
not fit the comparison.  By pointing up strengths and weaknesses at
each end, these chapters throw curves, possibly loops, into the concep-
tual continuum.
We develop the German-American comparison by placing employ-
ment relations side-by-side with related areas of political economic
activity.  This contextualization is unconventional.  It does not system-
atically examine the role of the state or the historical development of
institutions; neither does it offer traditional sectoral comparisons of
employment relations.  Therefore, we sacrifice some theoretical ele-
gance, analytical precision, and breadth of comparison.  However, we
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gain something we believe is more important: a sometimes messy but
empirically rich examination of key arenas of political economic
change, each of which either directly or indirectly influences and
reflects industrial and employment relations in the two countries.  Tak-
ing four different points of departure, we focus on the intersection
between the strategies and practices of employers, unions, and
employer associations (among other actors) and the cultural and insti-
tutional frameworks within which they operate.
Chapter 2, by Rosemary Batt and Owen Darbishire, analyzes the
deregulation and privatization of the telecommunications industries in
the United States and Germany, emphasizing the interplay between
organizational and institutional change and labor–management rela-
tions.  Batt and Darbishire place the break-up of AT&T and the deregu-
lation and privatization of Deutsche Telekom at opposite ends of a
continuum.  At the U.S. end of the continuum we see virtually no polit-
ical constraints on private-sector strategies.  In Germany, however, the
Postal Workers Union succeeded in slowing organizational change and
protecting workers in the process.  In both cases, but especially in Ger-
many, it is not clear that consumers have benefited substantially from
the reorganization of the industry.  However, it is clear that in Germany
labor has not (yet?) become a “loser” in this transformation, while the
U.S. change has resulted in mass layoffs and a weakening of the
unions.  Nevertheless, significant variations in labor–management rela-
tions and negotiations within this sector in the United States illustrate a
relatively wide range of possible outcomes.
David Finegold and Brent Keltner’s chapter on management devel-
opment (Chapter 3) draws attention to how the strengths of each coun-
try are mirrored by weaknesses in the other.  The authors argue that the
Germans are good at providing a high floor of technical competence in
managerial development.  They also show, however, that functional
specialization and organizational rigidity are supported by narrowly
defined university training curricula as well as management career
paths.  In the United States, by contrast, we find broadly skilled manag-
ers who are flexibly deployed in organizations.  However, in smaller
firms, the quality of management development (especially in technical
areas) is highly uneven, and the “floor” of management skills is lower
than in Germany.  This chapter sheds light on the advantages and dis-
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advantages of each country’s institutions and approaches to manage-
ment as a field, and thus management development.
In Chapter 4, Steven Casper compares two efforts at mutual learn-
ing and innovation in the area of supplier relations.  He analyzes the
implementation of Japanese just-in-time (JIT) inventory systems in
Germany and the United States and the significant implications for
changing relationships among firms.  In Germany, we learn just how
cumbersome institutional change can be in the face of preexisting legal
arrangements of corporate governance.  In the United States, Casper
shows the obstacles to the diffusion of innovations such as JIT in a set-
ting in which corporate law allows private sector firms far greater lati-
tude than in Germany.  Both the concerted employer action in Germany
and the company-by-company strategies in the United States have
advantages and disadvantages, and here again, variations within each
country suggest learning possibilities not just between the two coun-
tries but among industries and even firms within them.
Finally, in Chapter 5, Lowell Turner, Michael Fichter, and I exam-
ine contemporary employment relations in the two countries.  Because
employment relations are so deeply embedded in national and lower-
level institutional structures, this chapter follows from the others and
most clearly illustrates the interconnected nature of the various facets
of the two political economies.  We characterize Germany as struggling
with a crisis of the “high road”: high wages, high-level skills, and high
labor-value-added in a highly institutionalized labor market.  The
United States faces a crisis of the “low road,” with relatively stagnant
wages, income inequality, continuing union decline, and highly frag-
mented and competing systems of employment relations embedded in
an extremely diverse political economy.  Given the very different
nature of the problems facing the two countries, we suggest very differ-
ent policy prescriptions for approaching those crises, based in large
measure on the mirror image conceptualization noted earlier.
The political economic spheres of activity analyzed here either
directly involve or are closely interwoven with the relationship
between labor and employers.  Batt and Darbishire, in their chapter on
telecommunications, explicitly analyze the impact on labor–manage-
ment relations of this sector’s reorganization.  Finegold and Keltner’s
chapter on management training systems in the two countries has indi-
rect but critical importance for employment relations, because the way
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managers are trained has a great deal to do with how organizations are
run.  How managers are trained can not be disentangled from the con-
tent and effectiveness of management’s labor and human resource
strategies.  Relations among employers, such as the supplier relations
analyzed by Casper, tell us a great deal about the functioning of differ-
ent versions of capitalism (e.g., the social market versus the free mar-
ket variant).  These differences have important implications for the
scope of collective action in labor–management relations.  Finally, the
Turner, Fichter, and Wever analysis of employment relations in Chapter
5 explains how labor, management, and the employment relationship
shape and reflect their political economic contexts.
TRADE-OFFS
Powerful social actors cannot afford to and/or do not want to wait
for national political processes to solve urgent political economic prob-
lems; but they can benefit from the mutual learning process, and—as
the chapters of this volume show—to some extent they do.  Yet there
remains much to be done.  The German telecommunications industry
still appears far too constrained by the nature and tenor of labor–man-
agement relations to meet customers’ needs.  Institutional change, such
as the introduction of JIT, is hampered by the legal arrangements of
corporate governance.  Functional specialization and organizational
rigidity within firms are supported by narrowly defined university
training curricula and management career paths.  German employment
relations severely tax many struggling companies in the eastern states
and, increasingly, smaller companies in the west.  The U.S. case also
offers a mixed picture.  As the JIT story illustrates, the lack of mecha-
nisms in the United States for coordinating employers’ actions is not in
their collective interest.  Telecommunications deregulation has forced
more rapid firm-level adjustment than has been possible in Germany,
but the economy has also suffered from a lack of industry-wide coordi-
nation, which has in turn led to arguably unnecessary technological
investments and to suboptimal outcomes for labor and customers.
Especially in smaller U.S. firms, the uneven quality of management
development (particularly in technical areas) results in substantial mea-
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sure from the lack of coordinated skills and training standards above
the level of the individual firm.  Perhaps the most glaring example of
the problems associated with a lack of institutional framework supports
is found in employment relations and the resulting stagnant wages,
income inequality, union decline, and associated social problems.
In many regards, the U.S.-German comparison suggests an analogy,
with the strengths of each country reflected in the weaknesses of the
other.  While the U.S. economy is doing well by macroeconomic indi-
cators, the social costs of U.S.-style growth are significant.  If the Ger-
man social fabric remains fairly stable, fears about competitiveness,
especially in the high-technology and service sectors, combined with
continuing high levels of unemployment, present the opposite picture:
social stability at high economic cost.  There appears to be a trade-off
between the so-called employment miracle of the United States and the
relatively more even distribution of wealth and income (in part due to a
significant social wage) in the German social market economy.
We find evidence of trade-offs in each of the instances of political
economic change analyzed in this volume.  As illustrated by Batt and
Darbishire, in the German telecommunications industry, workers con-
tinue to maintain high levels of employment.  However, Deutsche Tele-
kom has been extremely slow to adopt new technologies and organi-
zational strategies, such that services long considered standard in the
United States remain limited or unavailable to German customers.  On
the other hand, rapid technological and organizational change in the
United States have benefited (especially business) consumers while
entailing considerable wage and work-rule concessions and mass lay-
offs among the industry’s workers.
The trade-off with respect to management development systems in
the two countries leaves most German firms with technically compe-
tent but functionally specialized managers, as shown by Finegold and
Keltner.  The high floor of technical competence appears to be gained
at the cost of the development of broadly skilled managers who could
be deployed cross-functionally in high-performance organizations (see,
for example, Applebaum and Batt 1994; Berg 1997).  In the United
States, by contrast, high-performance innovation is common in compa-
nies with strong market positions, while smaller, less competitive firms
are left to choose from a labor market pool of managers with relatively
low skill levels, especially in the area of technical competence.
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A similar contrast emerges in Casper’s analysis of supplier rela-
tions.  Here again, German institutional rigidities, in this instance in the
form of legal frameworks structuring interfirm relations, create barriers
to innovations in how suppliers and final producers distribute the risks
associated with the introduction of JIT.  The relatively unconstrained
nature of interfirm contracting relationships in the United States stands
in marked contrast.  However, the result in the United States is that
weaker market players, in this case supplier firms, are to some extent
forced to accept the terms of stronger final assemblers.  While some
U.S. assemblers have developed stable, long-term relations with sup-
pliers that mitigate some of the effects of this imbalance of market
power, many have not.  Meanwhile, historically rooted legal frame-
works in Germany work to protect suppliers at the expense of end pro-
ducers to the extent that the former require on-site inspection of
supplied parts at delivery—precisely the sort of time-consuming pro-
cess that JIT is designed to avoid.  As Casper points out, the familiar
institutional rigidity/market flexibility trade-off holds in this arena as
well.  The coordinated innovation of new legal frameworks within
trade associations in the German electronics industry (now apparently
diffusing to other industries) represents an exception rather than a rule.
Finally, the trade-off appears as one between stability and innova-
tion in Chapter 5 on employment relations.  The segmented U.S. sys-
tem, with multiple competing models of industrial, labor, and employ-
ment relations, is characterized by everything from internationally
impressive innovations in labor–management partnerships to low-trust,
low-skill, low-wage cases and industries.  Strong market players can
hire and retain skilled workers or train workers that they hire.  They can
also develop high-performance work organizations that capitalize on
workers’ skills, including their ability to participate directly in manage-
ment decision making, which in turn bolsters these companies’ overall
competitiveness.  Smaller and/or weaker companies, often lacking the
resources to train workers adequately, and often confronting a labor
pool of relatively unskilled workers (or workers whose skills do not
match their needs), are generally unable to pursue what Turner, Fichter,
and I call “high-road” employment strategies.  This further weakens
their overall market position.  Workers may “win” if they are employed
by “winning” companies or, in some cases, if they are represented by
unions that can induce firms to pursue high-road strategies.
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Undoubtedly some of these are unavoidable trade-offs between a
socially negotiated and a more unilateral market-oriented approach to
political economic change and adjustment.  However, it does not follow
that anything gained by mutual learning entails an equal and opposite
loss.  In the cases analyzed here, we find both necessary trade-offs and
trade-offs that may simply reflect articles of ideological faith that are
difficult to alter but are not in any way naturally determined.  We hope
that this book will help illustrate how these trade-offs can be finessed.
To do so, actors in each country will have to pay closer attention to the
difference between institutional constraints—ideologically unaccept-
able in the United States and increasingly onerous to some social actors
in Germany—and institutional supports.  Such supports  provide at least
the potential for balancing social and economic interests, as illustrated
by Germany’s spectacular postwar economic miracle.  
The Germans are probably at an advantage in that they already
have in place a set of institutions that can contain debates about new
and emerging issues of substantive change.  For instance, regional col-
lective bargaining among employer associations and large industrial
unions provides a forum for renegotiating which issues will be ham-
mered out between individual firms and their works councils and
which will be negotiated at the meso-level.  In the United States, local
and regional actors in a few places have begun to create such institu-
tions but these are as yet young and far from robust (Parker 1997).  Yet
in a different way, the United States is in a better position than Ger-
many: Americans seem to have a peculiar talent for seeing the need for
change, reorganizing and recombining resources (including human
resources) to accommodate shifting contexts, and then remaining open
and flexible.  It remains to be seen which—if either—of these compar-
ative fortés is more conducive to learning.
Notes
1. Neue Länder is the German term for the new states of the former East Germany.
2. Employers “poach” when they hire employees away from firms that have already
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